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Author: Omori, Yoshiaki
Resulting in 8 citations.
1. Light, Audrey L.
Omori, Yoshiaki
Can Long-Term Cohabiting and Marital Unions be Incentivized?
Research in Labor Economics 36 (2012): 241-283.
Also: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S0147-9121(2012)0000036011/full/html
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Emerald
Keyword(s): Cohabitation; Marriage; Unions

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

In this study, we ask whether economic factors that can be directly manipulated by public policy have important effects on the probability that women experience long-lasting unions. Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we estimate a five-stage sequential choice model for women's transitions between single with no prior unions, cohabiting, first-married, re-single (divorced or separated), and remarried. We control for expected income tax burdens, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits, Medicaid expenditures, and parameters of state divorce laws, along with an array of demographic, family background, and market factors. We simulate women's sequences of transitions from age 18 to 48 and use the simulated outcomes to predict the probability that a woman with given characteristics (a) forms a first union by age 24 and maintains the union for at least 12 years, and (b) forms a second union by age 36 and maintains it for at least 12 years. While non-policy factors such as race and schooling prove to have important effects on the predicted probabilities of long-term unions, the policy factors have small and/or imprecisely estimated effects; in short, we fail to identify policy mechanisms that could potentially be used to incentivize long-term unions.
Bibliography Citation
Light, Audrey L. and Yoshiaki Omori. "Can Long-Term Cohabiting and Marital Unions be Incentivized?" Research in Labor Economics 36 (2012): 241-283.
2. Light, Audrey L.
Omori, Yoshiaki
Determinants of Long-Term Unions: Who Survives the “Seven Year Itch”?
Presented: Washington, DC, Population Association of America Annual Meetings, March 31-April 2, 2011
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Population Association of America
Keyword(s): Cohabitation; Coresidence; Life Course; Marital Stability; Marriage

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Most studies of union formation and dissolution identify probabilities of union transitions in the next year; they do not reveal the likelihood of forming unions and maintaining them for the long-term. We use NLSY79 data to estimate a series of choice models in which never-married women decide when to cohabit or marry, cohabitors decide when to separate or marry, first-married women decide when to divorce, and women with prior unions advance through similar stages. We use the estimates to simulate women's union-related outcomes from age 18 to 42, and then predict probabilities of following long-term paths. We find that cohabitation substantially increases the probability of entering and maintaining a long-term union (defined as 8+ years) because the high chance of entry outweighs the low chance of stability. We also find that race and skill affect probabilities of long-term unions, but determinants that can be manipulated by public policy do not.
Bibliography Citation
Light, Audrey L. and Yoshiaki Omori. "Determinants of Long-Term Unions: Who Survives the “Seven Year Itch”?." Presented: Washington, DC, Population Association of America Annual Meetings, March 31-April 2, 2011.
3. Light, Audrey L.
Omori, Yoshiaki
Determinants of Long-Term Unions: Who Survives the “Seven Year Itch”?
Population Research and Policy Review 32,6 (December 2013): 851-891.
Also: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11113-013-9285-6
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Springer
Keyword(s): Cohabitation; Divorce; Marital History/Transitions; Marriage; Racial Differences

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Most studies of union formation focus on short-term probabilities of marrying, cohabiting, or divorcing in the next year. In this study, we take a long-term perspective by considering joint probabilities of marrying or cohabiting by certain ages and maintaining the unions for at least 8, 12, or even 24 years. We use data for female respondents in the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to estimate choice models for multiple stages of the union-forming process. We then use the estimated parameters to simulate each woman’s sequence of union transitions from ages 18–46, and use the simulated outcomes to predict probabilities that women with given characteristics follow a variety of long-term paths. We find that a typical, 18 year-old woman with no prior unions has a 22 % chance of cohabiting or marrying within 4 years and maintaining the union for 12+ years; this predicted probability remains steady until the woman nears age 30, when it falls to 17 %. We also find that unions entered via cohabitation contribute significantly to the likelihood of experiencing a long-term union, and that this contribution grows with age and (with age held constant) as women move from first to second unions. This finding reflects the fact that the high probability of entering a cohabiting union more than offsets the relatively low probability of maintaining it for the long-term. Third, the likelihood of forming a union and maintaining it for the long-term is highly sensitive to race, but is largely invariant to factors that can be manipulated by public policy such as divorce laws, welfare benefits, and income tax laws.
Bibliography Citation
Light, Audrey L. and Yoshiaki Omori. "Determinants of Long-Term Unions: Who Survives the “Seven Year Itch”?" Population Research and Policy Review 32,6 (December 2013): 851-891.
4. Light, Audrey L.
Omori, Yoshiaki
Economic Incentives and Family Formation
Presented: Philadelphia, PA, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, March-April 2005
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Population Association of America
Keyword(s): Coresidence; Cost-Benefit Studies; Divorce; Marriage

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

We identify the importance of a broad set of economic factors in driving individuals' decisions to marry, cohabit and divorce. Most studies of union formation consider such factors as schooling attainment, employment status, and wages. We broaden the focus to economic costs and benefits conferred by law on married couples. Upon marrying, couples typically incur changes in their income taxes, face lower costs if one partner dies, incur changes in their welfare benefits, and secure property rights in the event of divorce. We wish to learn whether individuals are more likely to choose marriage over the alternatives when the benefits associated with civil marriage are large. We use data from the NLSY79 to estimate a sequential choice model of cohabitation, marriage and divorce decisions, and exploit exogenous variation arising from cross-state and cross-year differences in the relevant laws and institutions to identify the effects of "legal factors" on union-forming decisions.
Bibliography Citation
Light, Audrey L. and Yoshiaki Omori. "Economic Incentives and Family Formation." Presented: Philadelphia, PA, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, March-April 2005.
5. Light, Audrey L.
Omori, Yoshiaki
Fixed Effects Maximum Likelihood Estimation of a Flexibly Parametric Proportional Hazard Model with an Application to Job Exits
Economics Letters 116,2 (August 2012): 236-239.
Also: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512000869
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Elsevier
Keyword(s): Education; Employment; Job Tenure; Job Turnover; Modeling, Hazard/Event History/Survival/Duration

We extend the fixed effects maximum likelihood estimator to a proportional hazard model with a flexibly parametric baseline hazard. We use the method to estimate a job duration model for young men, and show that failure to account for unobserved fixed effects causes negative schooling and union effects to be downward biased.
Bibliography Citation
Light, Audrey L. and Yoshiaki Omori. "Fixed Effects Maximum Likelihood Estimation of a Flexibly Parametric Proportional Hazard Model with an Application to Job Exits." Economics Letters 116,2 (August 2012): 236-239.
6. Light, Audrey L.
Omori, Yoshiaki
Unemployment Insurance and Job Quits
Journal of Labor Economics 22,1 (January 2004):159-189.
Also: http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=12322932&db=buh
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Keyword(s): Benefits, Insurance; Job Turnover; Modeling, Hazard/Event History/Survival/Duration; Quits; Unemployment Insurance

We investigate an unexplored avenue through which unemployment insurance increases unemployment. As unemployment insurance benefits rise, workers lose incentive to "preempt" impending layoffs by changing jobs. We formalize this prediction in a job search model and investigate it empirically by estimating a proportional hazard model with data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, using state- and year-specific algorithms to compute each worker's expected unemployment insurance benefits. Our estimates reveal that an exogenous increase in benefits deters job quits by a small but statistically significant amount.
Bibliography Citation
Light, Audrey L. and Yoshiaki Omori. "Unemployment Insurance and Job Quits." Journal of Labor Economics 22,1 (January 2004):159-189.
7. Omori, Yoshiaki
Job Shopping Behavior of Young Men
Working Paper, Storrs CT: Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, November 1994
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Connecticut
Keyword(s): Heterogeneity; Job Search; Job Tenure; Job Turnover; Modeling, Hazard/Event History/Survival/Duration; Transition Rates, Activity to Work

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Using bimonthly job duration data of young men taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I estimate the job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment transition hazards by a semiparametric competing risks model which controls for unobserved heterogeneity fixed over time within individual. Both hazards increase with job tenure during the first two months and decrease subsequently, consistent with models of job matching in which worker's performance after hiring provides useful information on the quality of a match.
Bibliography Citation
Omori, Yoshiaki. "Job Shopping Behavior of Young Men." Working Paper, Storrs CT: Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, November 1994.
8. Omori, Yoshiaki
Work History and Mobility
Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1990
Cohort(s): NLSY79, Young Men
Publisher: UMI - University Microfilms, Bell and Howell Information and Learning
Keyword(s): College Graduates; Earnings; Job Tenure; Mobility; Work Experience; Work Histories

Young workers are an unknown entity when they enter the job market. Information on the quality of workers gets revealed in an asymmetric fashion between the current employer and the prospective employer. Higher quality workers would gain if they could offer reliable information to employers, but they often fail because they cannot provide any evidence of their higher quality until they establish their work history. This study introduces a strategic model that focuses on this asymmetric information and the role played by the work history in information spill-over. The model offers the following set of implementations: (1) The expected hazard rate is nonincreasing in both tenure and experience. (2) Among workers who are seemingly identical to employers at the time of their market entry, the less productive ones are more likely to move. (3) Tenure and expected productivity are positively correlated among workers who are seemingly identical at the time of their market entry, holding experience constant--i.e., the oldest workers in a firm are the most productive among those who were indistinguishable at the time of their market entry. (4) The wage increases in tenure, holding experience constant. (5) Current earnings and future earnings are positively correlated across a group of individuals who are seemingly identical at the time of their market entry. (6) The variance of the earnings distribution for seemingly identical workers grows in experience first and then becomes constant with or without holding tenure constant. (7) The variance of the earnings distribution of equally productive workers who are also seemingly identical will first increase in experience and decrease later with or without holding tenure constant. Due to data constraints, the empirical study focuses on implications (5) and (6). Using data from NLSY and NLS of YoungMen, evidence consistent with these implications is found among college graduates in professional and managerial occupations. [UMI ADG90-33570]
Bibliography Citation
Omori, Yoshiaki. Work History and Mobility. Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1990.