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Author: Pezzin, Liliana E.
Resulting in 3 citations.
1. Pezzin, Liliana E.
Earnings Prospects, Matching Effects, and the Decision to Terminate a Criminal Career
Journal of Quantitative Criminology 11,1 (March 1995): 29-50.
Also: http://www.springerlink.com/content/k245pv441u576522/
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Plenum Publishing Corporation
Keyword(s): Adolescent Behavior; Delinquency/Gang Activity; Earnings; Economic Changes/Recession; Income; Modeling; Punishment, Criminal; Welfare; Youth Problems

Data from the 1979 Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey (N = 12,686 respondents ages 14-22) are used to investigate the age pattern of criminal involvement from an economist's perspective. A dynamic stochastic model of sequential search and match evaluation is used to explain the reasons for, and the timing of, the decision to terminate a criminal career. Estimation results strongly support the prediction of a negative relation between the option value of retaining a criminal career and desistance decisions. More specifically, the effects of current and future expected criminal earnings are shown to be negative, substantial, and statistically significant in determining desistance probabilities. Retiring behavior is also significantly related to variables measuring personal costs of punishment and the availability and attractiveness of a legal income-generating activity in ways consistent with theoretical expectations. 4 Tables, 37 References. Adapted from the source document. (Copyright 1995, Sociological Abstracts, Inc., all rights reserved.)
Bibliography Citation
Pezzin, Liliana E. "Earnings Prospects, Matching Effects, and the Decision to Terminate a Criminal Career." Journal of Quantitative Criminology 11,1 (March 1995): 29-50.
2. Pezzin, Liliana E.
Incentivos de Mercado e Comportamento Criminoso: Uma Analise Economica Dinamica (with English summary)
Estudos Económicos 24,3 (September-December 1994): 373-404
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Económicas (IPE), Universidade de São Paulo
Keyword(s): Illegal Activities; Labor Market Outcomes; Labor Market Surveys; Life Cycle Research; Modeling

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

This paper presents and estimates a dynamic economic model of criminal involvement. The paper's main goal is to determine the extent to which market incentives, as distinct from background and other constraints, influence the dynamics of criminal careers. It is argued that career profile choices and desistance decisions depend critically upon general and math-specific factors affecting the life-cycle pattern of net legal and illegal rewards. An analysis of individual data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth supports that expectation.
Bibliography Citation
Pezzin, Liliana E. "Incentivos de Mercado e Comportamento Criminoso: Uma Analise Economica Dinamica (with English summary)." Estudos Económicos 24,3 (September-December 1994): 373-404.
3. Pezzin, Liliana E.
When Crime No Longer Pays: A Dynamic Economic Analysis of Crime Desistance Decisions
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1992
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: UMI - University Microfilms, Bell and Howell Information and Learning
Keyword(s): Crime; Illegal Activities; Income; Life Cycle Research; Modeling, Logit; Modeling, Probit; Punishment, Criminal

This paper presents a dynamic stochastic model of sequential search and match evaluation used to explain the reasons for and timing of the decision to terminate a criminal career. It emphasizes that the life-cycle of criminal involvement is generated in an uncertain environment and departs from the existing literature by positing that career profile choices and desistance decisions depend critically on general and match-specific factors affecting the life-cycle pattern of net legal and illegal rewards. The study conceptually solves the implied optimal desistance strategy problem for the individual criminal, derives the behavioral implications of this solution for the empirical work and estimates the parameters of the model using individual National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data. To consistently implement the model, selectivity-corrected imputations of criminal and legal market earnings are first obtained, via a multinomial logit-OLS and a probit-OLS two-stage estimation method, respectively, and then substituted in the structural desistance probability logit equation. Estimation results strongly support the theoretical prediction of a negative relation between the option value of retaining a criminal career and desistance decisions. More specifically, the effects of current and future expected criminal earnings are shown to be negative, substantial and statistically significant in determining desistance probabilities. Retiring behavior is also significantly responsive to variables measuring personal costs of punishment and the availability and attractiveness of a legal income-generating activity in ways consistent with theoretical expectations.
Bibliography Citation
Pezzin, Liliana E. When Crime No Longer Pays: A Dynamic Economic Analysis of Crime Desistance Decisions. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington, 1992.