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Title: Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes
Resulting in 1 citation.
1. Flinn, Christopher Jay
Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 15,2 (April 1997): 221-236.
Also: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1392307
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: American Statistical Association
Keyword(s): Wage Dynamics; Wage Equations; Wage Theory; Wages

An equilibrium model is developed and estimated of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences that are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. Sufficient conditions are provided for there to exist a unique termination-contract type of equilibrium. The equilibrium model is estimated using microlevel data from the national Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel. Photocopy available from ABI/INFORM
Bibliography Citation
Flinn, Christopher Jay. "Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 15,2 (April 1997): 221-236.