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The first essay studies the determinants of wage differences between predominantly female jobs and predominantly male jobs. In particular, I estimate the effects of the changes in proportion of men in an occupation on wage growth for workers who quit jobs and for those laid off. These estimates account for the fixed individual heterogeneity and job match specific error component, and they provide either an upper or lower bound on the true wage premium associated with working in predominantly male jobs. The estimated wage premium is in the range of 16-19 percent for women and 12-16 percent for men. The proportion male effect for quits is smaller than that for layoffs for both women and men, which implies that the wage premium overcompensates for the non-wage characteristics.

In the second essay, I analyze equilibrium search models in which jobs vary in terms of salary and hours of work. Jobs are heterogeneous in productivity, and the model is set up so that jobs with larger marginal productivity of an additional hour require more hours. In one version of the model, an employer offers two packages to workers. Simulated data match the empirical results in the first essay when: (1) women are more averse to work hours than men and (2) the likelihood of receiving an offer that workers cannot refuse to accept is higher for women than men. In the other version of the model, an employer offers a single package that accounts for the gender differences in preference. I develop an algorithm which solves for the equilibrium job distribution and show that employers raise the hour requirements when they discriminate against women.

The third essay uses an insider model of equilibrium unemployment to show that severance pay affects the jointly rational separation decisions of an employer and a worker. In particular, severance pay raises the equilibrium market tightness which is documented in a number of empirical studies.