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Title: Information in the Labor Market: Empirical Studies of Incentive Pay, Work Hours, and Earnings
Resulting in 1 citation.
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Moore, Carol S. |
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Information in the Labor Market: Empirical Studies of Incentive Pay, Work Hours, and Earnings Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1994 Cohort(s): NLSY79 Publisher: UMI - University Microfilms, Bell and Howell Information and Learning Keyword(s): Earnings; Ethnic Differences; Gender Differences; Hispanics; Industrial Relations; Labor Economics; Modeling, Fixed Effects; Occupational Choice; Occupational Status; Skilled Workers; Work Hours/Schedule This dissertation tests models of information in the labor market using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). "Do Monitoring Costs Explain Positive Returns to Tenure? Evidence from Incentive Pay Earners," assesses the role of monitoring costs in internal labor markets using NLSY data on method of pay. Several models predict that employers deter shirking by combining positive wage-tenure profiles with the threat of dismissal when monitoring costs are high. Because incentive pay bases a worker's pay explicitly on individual performance, incentive pay jobs have relatively low costs of monitoring worker performance. A fixed effects model is estimated by following wages for up to six years on the job. Contrary to the predictions of the monitoring costs model, incentive pay wages grow faster on the job than do time-rate wages. "Information, Incentive Pay, and Labor Market Discrimination," documents racial and gender differences in method of pay and in incentive pay wages. Results are considered in light of statistical and customer discrimination models. The scope for statistical discrimination is smaller where incentive pay is offered, so that skilled women and minorities may exhibit especially high returns to incentive pay in production jobs. Customer discrimination suggests that women and minorities experience depressed returns to incentive pay in customer-oriented service and sales jobs in which they are not traditionally represented. Models of occupational choice, method of pay, and earnings across and within occupations are estimated. Racial and gender wage gaps are found to be no smaller under incentive pay than under time rate systems in production jobs. However, evidence of customer discrimination is found for women and blacks in customer-oriented service jobs, and for Hispanics in sales jobs. "Economies of Agglomeration and Productivity: The Role of Starting Time," tests for economies of agglomeration by estimating the relationship between wages and work start time. A model is developed in which the concentration of start times around the peak exerts two mutually offsetting effects on productivity: economies of agglomeration and diminishing returns to labor. The empirical results imply that economies of agglomeration dominate diminishing returns across occupations and for managers and professionals. |
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Bibliography Citation
Moore, Carol S. Information in the Labor Market: Empirical Studies of Incentive Pay, Work Hours, and Earnings. Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1994. |