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Author: Beauchamp, Andrew
Resulting in 3 citations.
1. Beauchamp, Andrew
Chan, Stacey
The Minimum Wage and Crime
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 14,3 (2014): 1213-1235.
Also: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2013-0130
Cohort(s): NLSY97
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG
Keyword(s): Crime; Legislation; Minimum Wage; State-Level Data/Policy

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Does crime respond to changes in the minimum wage? A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that increases in the minimum wage have a displacement effect on low-skilled workers. Economic reasoning provides the possibility that disemployment may cause youth to substitute from legal work to crime. However, there is also the countervailing effect of a higher wage raising the opportunity cost of crime for those who remain employed. We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort to measure the effect of increases in the minimum wage on self-reported criminal activity and examine employment-crime substitution. Exploiting changes in state and federal minimum wage laws from 1997 to 2010, we find that workers who are affected by a change in the minimum wage are more likely to commit crime, become idle, and lose employment. Individuals experiencing a binding minimum wage change were more likely to commit crime and work only part time. Analyzing heterogeneity shows those with past criminal connections are especially likely to see decreased employment and increased crime following a policy change, suggesting that reduced employment effects dominate any wage effects. The findings have implications for policy regarding both the low-wage labor market and efforts to deter criminal activity.
Bibliography Citation
Beauchamp, Andrew and Stacey Chan. "The Minimum Wage and Crime." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 14,3 (2014): 1213-1235.
2. Beauchamp, Andrew
Sanzenbacher, Geoffrey
Seitz, Shannon
Skira, Meghan
Deadbeat Dads
Boston College Working Papers in Economics No. 859, Department of Economics, Boston College, July 2014
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Boston College
Keyword(s): Child Support; Childbearing, Premarital/Nonmarital; Earnings; Fatherhood; Fathers, Absence; Racial Differences

Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher.

Why do some men father children outside of marriage but not provide support? Why are some single women willing to have children outside of marriage when they receive little or no support from unmarried fathers? Why is this behavior especially common among blacks? To shed light on these questions, we develop and estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support. We consider the extent to which low earnings and a shortage of single men relative to single women among blacks can explain the prevalence of deadbeat dads and non-marital childbearing. We estimate the model by indirect inference using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. We simulate three distinct counterfactual policy environments: perfect child support enforcement, eliminating the black-white earnings gap, and equalizing black-white population supplies (and therefore gender ratios). We find perfect enforcement reduces non-marital childbearing dramatically, particularly among blacks; over time it translates into many fewer couples living with children from past relationships, and therefore less deadbeat fatherhood. Eliminating the black-white earnings gap reduces the marriage rate difference between blacks and whites by 29 to 43 percent; black child poverty rates fall by nearly 40 percent. Finally equalizing gender ratios has little effect on racial differences in marriage and fertility.
Bibliography Citation
Beauchamp, Andrew, Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Shannon Seitz and Meghan Skira. "Deadbeat Dads." Boston College Working Papers in Economics No. 859, Department of Economics, Boston College, July 2014.
3. Beauchamp, Andrew
Sanzenbacher, Geoffrey
Seitz, Shannon
Skira, Meghan
Single Moms and Deadbeat Dads: The Role of Earnings, Marriage Market Conditions, and Preference Heterogeneity
International Economic Review 59,1 (February 2018): 191-232.
Also: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/iere.12267/abstract
Cohort(s): NLSY79
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing, Inc. => Wiley Online
Keyword(s): Child Support; Fathers; Mothers; Parents, Non-Custodial; Parents, Single; Racial Differences

Why do some men father children outside of marriage without providing support? Why do some women have children outside of marriage when they receive little support from fathers? Why is this behavior more common among blacks than whites? We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of marriage, employment, fertility, and child support decisions. We consider the extent to which low earnings, marriage market conditions, and preference heterogeneity explain non-marital childbearing, deadbeat fatherhood, and racial differences in these outcomes. We find the black-white earnings gap and preference heterogeneity explain a substantial portion of racial differences, while marriage market conditions are less important.
Bibliography Citation
Beauchamp, Andrew, Geoffrey Sanzenbacher, Shannon Seitz and Meghan Skira. "Single Moms and Deadbeat Dads: The Role of Earnings, Marriage Market Conditions, and Preference Heterogeneity." International Economic Review 59,1 (February 2018): 191-232.