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Author: Weinstein, Russell
Resulting in 2 citations.
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Lang, Kevin Weinstein, Russell |
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A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers NBER Working Paper No. 22387. National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2016. Also: http://nber.org/papers/w22387 Cohort(s): NLSY79 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Keyword(s): Wage Growth We show that in labor market models with adverse selection, otherwise observationally equivalent workers will experience less wage growth following a period in which they change jobs than following a period in which they do not. We find little or no evidence to support this prediction. In most specifications the coefficient has the opposite sign, sometimes statistically significantly so. When consistent with the prediction, the estimated effects are small and statistically insignificant. We consistently reject large effects in the predicted direction. We argue informally that our results are also problematic for a broader class of models of competitive labor markets. |
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Bibliography Citation
Lang, Kevin and Russell Weinstein. "A Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Experienced Workers." NBER Working Paper No. 22387. National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2016. |
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Weinstein, Russell Lang, Kevin Cavounidis, Costas |
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The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers The Economic Journal published online (27 September 2023). Also: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead079 Cohort(s): NLSY79 Publisher: Royal Economic Society (RES) Keyword(s): Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT); Black Studies; Discrimination; Discrimination, Employer; Discrimination, Job; Discrimination, Racial/Ethnic; Employment; Employment History; Income; Monitoring, Discriminatory; Racial Equality/Inequality; Racial Studies; Unemployment; Unemployment Duration Permission to reprint the abstract has not been received from the publisher. African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar Whites. We hypothesize that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring Black, but not White, workers is self-sustaining. New Black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivizing discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs are initially higher for Black than non-Black workers, but that they converge with seniority and decline more with the Armed Forces Qualification Test for Black workers. Two additional predictions, lower lifetime incomes and longer unemployment durations for Black workers, have known empirical support. |
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Bibliography Citation
Weinstein, Russell, Kevin Lang and Costas Cavounidis. "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers ." The Economic Journal published online (27 September 2023).
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